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I. SUBJECTS AND INCIDENCE or TAXATION
A. Inheritance Taxes
Old Folks Home of St. Louis County v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.'
illustrates the advisability of clearly expressing one's intention as to the
incidence or burden of the Missouri inheritance tax and any shifting
thereof to someone other than the recipient of the property. Failure to
express such intention in clear, direct language may result in a dispute
and require litigation to ascertain such intention from a construction of
the instrument in question as a whole. The setting aside of a reserve for
taxes as a part of a plan by which the deceased sought to insure im-
mediate and full payment to her preresiduary beneficiaries was believed
by the court to signify an implied intention to exonerate the preresiduary
beneficiaries from the payment of inheritance taxes and to shift the bur-
den thereof to the residuary estate. However, the court could not find any
intention to shift all or any part of the inheritance tax burden of one
residuary beneficiary to the other residuary beneficiary which was, by
statute, exempt from inheritance tax liability. While the residuary estate
was to be "divided in equal shares," it was held that such division was
to be made before rather than after payment of the inheritance tax due
by reason of the residuary gifts.
B. Sales Tax
Hera v. Carpenter2 held that all sales of gasoline are exempt from
liability for sales tax. The state cannot collect sales tax even on those
sales where the gasoline is actually used for purposes other than op-
erating motor vehicles on state highways and the purchaser thereby
becomes entitled to and does, in fact, obtain a refund of the excise tax
paid at the time of purchase.
C. Taxation of Railroads
By statute,3 only that portion of the total value of a railroad's rolling
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1958 and 1959 Missouri court
decisions.
**Attorney, Springfield, Missouri; A.B., University of Missouri, 1948, LL.B., 1950.
1. 313 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1958).
2. 312 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1958).
3. § 151.060, RSMo 1949.
(470)
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stock is taxable in Missouri as the ratio of the number of miles of such
road in Missouri bears to the total length of road owned or controlled
by the railroad in all states. Such formula does not require track owner-
ship or exclusive control by lease or otherwise. On the contrary, rail-
road track used pursuant to so-called "trackage right" agreements,
providing for joint use of such railroad track with the owner thereof,
must be included if the railroad has sufficient control of such track to
operate thereon its rolling stock on a regular, habitual and continuous
*basis as a part of its interstate system.4
D. Employment Security Tax
For an employer to be entitled to a reduced contribution experience
rating under the Missouri Employment Security Law, 5 he must not only
have been subject to contribution liability for thirty-six consecutive
calendar months immedately preceding the calculation date for the
next calendar year but must have been chargeable for such period with
benefits paid under the law. Thus, in Anderson Air Activities, Inc. v.
Division of Employment Security,6 plaintiff first became subject to the
law in June, 1951, and had paid contributions for thirty-six months by
July 1, 1954 (the calculation date for calendar year 1955), but was. still
not entitled to an experience rating because its account did not become
chargeable with benefits until the first calendar quarter of 1952.
II. PRoPERTY ExEMPT PRom TAXAToN
In Schmoll v. Housing Authority of St. Louis County,7 the court
recognized that previous decisions" had held that property subject to the
Housing Authorities Law9 is exempt from ad valorem taxes. It was also
noted that a contractual provision for annual payments in lieu of taxes
had previously been held valid.'0
4. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 319 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1959).
5. §§ 288.010-.460, RSMo 1949, as amended.
6. 321 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. 1959).
7. 321 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1959).
8. Bader Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 358 Mo. 747, 217
S.W.2d 489 (1949) (en bane); Laret Inv. Co. v. Dicknann, 345 Mo. 449, 134 S.W.2d
65 (1939) (en bane).
9. §§ 99.010-.230, RSMo 1949, as amended.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
m. AssEssMNT OF TAXEs
In May Dep't Stores Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,'1 the Commission had
issued an order for the purpose of equalizing land values among several
counties, including St. Louis County. Thereafter, the St. Louis County
Board of Equalization ordered a re-assessment of a commercially zoned
area in which plaintiff's property was located. The re-assessment resulted
in the valuation of plaintiff's property being increased even more than
was required by the Commission's order. Plaintiff appealed from the
assessed value of its property under the County Board's re-assessment
order and sought to avoid any increase at all by contending that the
orders of the Commission and the County Board were void as being
discriminatory and unconstitutional.
Although a contemplated re-assessment of all property in the county
would probably take two or three years to complete, the County Board's
order was upheld as a step toward attaining uniformity in the county
assessments at a time when a complete revaluation was immediately
impossible. The court held that under its authority and duty to raise
the valuations of any and all tracts deemed by it to be returned at less
than their real value, the County Board not only could raise the valua-
tions of designated specific tracts within an area but could single out an
entire area to be increased. There was evidence that the entire area in
question had increased in value to a far greater extent than any other
commercial area. Plaintiff also failed to show the actual value of its land
and other in the same class or the value of other property in the county
generally. There was, therefore, no basis for a finding of discrimination
or violation of either the state constitutional requirement of uniformity
in the taxation of a class of property or the equal protection provisions of
the federal constitution.
In regard to the Commission's order, the court pointed out that there
is no statutory provision for an appeal from orders and judgments of the
Commission and that an order such as the one in question, if not directly
attacked, constitutes a final judgment and can neither be attacked col-
laterally nor subjected to review in a taxpayer's appeal from a specific
valuation by a county board. Since plaintiff's action was not a direct
attack on the Commission's order but an appeal from the County Board's
11. 308 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1958).
[Vol. 24
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re-assessment, the validity of the Commission's order was not a proper
matter for consideration.
In Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,12 it was pointed out
that boards of equalization have original jurisdiction of intracounty
equalization' 3 and that the State Tax Commission has exclusive juris-
diction of intercounty equalization. 14 Plaintiffs conceded that their land
was assessed at less than its true value and on a basis which was equal
and comparable with all other real estate in the City of St. Louis. Having
thereby admitted that the Board of Equalizaion had fully performed its
duty of intracity equalization, plaintiffs were held not entitled to any
relief in an appeal from the action of the Board of Equalization refusing
to reduce the valuations placed on plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs' contention
that their property had been assessed at a higher percentage of its true
value than other property of the same class situated in other counties
throughout the state could only be made in a direct attack on an order
of intercounty equalization issued by the Commission.
A direct attack by a taxpayer upon the validity of an intercounty
equalization order issued by the State Tax Commission resulted in the
prohibition action of State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Walsh.'5 The
taxpayer directly attacked the equalization order in the Circuit Court of
the City of St. Louis under section 536.105, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1949) .16 The commission then sought to prohibit the circuit judge from
exercising jurisdiction over it and was successful on the ground that the
action by the taxpayer was governed by the process and venue require-
ments' 7 of the Civil Code rather than the Administrative Procedure and
Review Act.' 8 Venue of actions for judicial review of non-contested
administrative decisions was held to be in Cole County.
In Taney County v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co.,19 the court concluded that
it need not actually determine whether the State Tax Commission, when
12. 319 S.W2d 590 (Mo. 1958).
13. § 138.150, RSMo 1949.
14. § 138.390, RSMo 1949.
15. 315 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1958) (en bane).
16. In May Dep't Stores Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra note 11, it was indicated
that this statute was not applicable to an intercounty equalization order.
17. §§ 506.110, 508.010, RSMo 1949.
18. §§ 536.010-.140, RSMo 1949, as amended.
19. 309 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1958).
1959]
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reviewing an assessment, was required by statute20 to make its order at
the very time and place of the hearing. Even assuming that the statute
so required, the provision was held directory only and not mandatory.
Therefore, such an order is not invalid because entered after the date of
the hearing. If the order is made after October 31 (by which date section
137.290, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), specifies that the county clerk
shall have delivered the tax books to the county collector), the court
indicated that the county clerk should prepare a supplemental tax book
in accordance with the order and deliver it to the county collector.
In Koplar v. State Tax Comm'n,2 1 the circuit court was held to have
exceeded its jurisdiction in determining the value of certain properties,
fixing the assessment that should be placed upon each particular tract,
and ordering the Commission to modify its decisions accordingly. A
circuit court is forbidden by statute22 to substitute its discretion for dis-
cretion legally vested in the Commission.
IV. CoLLEcTIoN or TAXEs
Even though an appeal is pending in a statutory proceeding instituted
by a taxpayer to contest an assessment, such taxpayer must, nevertheless,
pursue the same statutory remedy to contest an identical assessment made
the next year. The taxpayer cannot, on the ground of preventing a
multiplicity of suits, resort to a court of equity to stay collection of the
contested portion of the taxes for the second and subsequent years, pend-
ing the final determination of the appeal contesting the first year's
assessment.23 That there might be a different result under certain
circumstances is indicated by the court's comment that it was not the
plaintiff's theory that the taxing officials had exceeded their jurisdiction
or powers, that the property was immune or exempt from taxation, or
that the assessment was made vexatiously.
In a summary proceeding against an ex-officio collector of a county
under township organization, the state was permitted to recover fees and
commissions retained in excess of those allowed by law although the
statutory penalty was not assessed.24
20. § 138.470, RSMo 1949, provides, in part that the Commission "shall then and
there hear and determine as to the proper assessment of all property and persons
mentioned in said notice. .. "
21. 321 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1959).
22. § 536.140(5), RSMo 1949, as amended.
23. Cupples-Hesse Corp. v. Bannister, 322 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1959).
24. State v. Ludwig, 322 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
[Vol. 24
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V. TAX SAms AND TThES
In Klorner v. Nunn,25 a collector's tax deed was held void on its face
because it was not witnessed by the county clerk as expressly required by
statute.26 Therefore, section 140.590, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949),
the three year limitation statute against attack on a collector's tax deed,
was never set in motion and did not bar plaintiffs' action to set aside the
tax deed.
25. 318 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1958).
26. Mo. Laws 1933, at 438, § 9957a, as amended, § 140.460, RSMo 1949.
1959]
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